tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8766213929139682844.post1165594746859867213..comments2023-10-15T08:36:48.841-07:00Comments on A Counter Apologist Blog: Prescriptive Oughts and Atheism: Round 3A Counter Apologisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15173218521712325250noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8766213929139682844.post-11516415137693750182018-08-25T19:58:15.522-07:002018-08-25T19:58:15.522-07:00I've recently written a scholarly article on t...I've recently written a scholarly article on the "prescriptive ought" thing and why it leads to moral non-naturalism here: https://www.academia.edu/37192929/A_Folk_Semantics_Argument_for_Moral_Non-Naturalism_Draft_<br /><br />For the technical background (if you're rusty in math or formal logic) for the paper: http://www.maverick-christian.org/2018/08/moral-ought-facts-are-non-natural.htmlMaverick Christianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04286456663634536819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8766213929139682844.post-44091487614310785542017-10-26T19:55:29.514-07:002017-10-26T19:55:29.514-07:00It occurred to me that it would help to do a bit o...It occurred to me that it would help to do a bit of philosophical analysis of what a "fact" is when considering whether moral facts are natural facts. <br /><br />A "fact" is what makes a truth-bearer true. For example, the statement "Sam is sitting on a chair" would be made true by the fact that Sam is sitting on a chair. Note that other facts associated with Sam sitting on a chair aren't involved in making "Sam is sitting on a chair" true. For example, it doesn't matter whether the chair is made of wood, plastic, or metal. The fact that Sam is sitting on <em>a</em> chair is what makes the statement "Sam is sitting on a chair" true. <em>Sam is sitting on a chair</em> is thus not the same fact as <em>Sam is sitting on metal chair</em>, because the chair being metal isn't what makes the statement "Sam is sitting on a chair" true; the statement would be true even if Sam were sitting on a wooden chair.<br /><br />Similarly, consider that the statement "Adolph is torturing infants just for fun" would be made true by the fact that Adolph is torturing infants just for fun. The fact that the action is morally wrong may, by metaphysical necessity, be associated with the fact that Adolph is torturing infants just for fun. However, if <em>per impossibile</em> the action were not morally wrong but it was still true that Adolph is torturing infants just for fun, then the statement "Adolph is torturing infants just for fun" would still be true. It might be true as a matter of metaphysical necessity that there cannot be a change in moral facts (e.g. "Adolph is doing something morally wrong") without there being a change in non-moral facts (e.g. "Adolph is torturing infants just for fun"); in philosophical parlance we would say that moral facts <em>supervene on</em> non-moral facts. Nonetheless, non-moral facts aren't the same thing as moral facts.<br /><br />Similarly, what makes a statement like "the solution is acidic" true is that the solution is acidic. Such natural facts are descriptive. Even if prescriptive ought facts <em>supervene on</em> certain natural facts, the natural facts themselves are not prescriptive ought facts. It remains true that the language of psychology and the natural sciences is purely descriptive in nature, and as long as that's true, natural facts (facts that can be expressed entirely in the language of psychology and the natural sciences) are descriptive facts.<br /><br />What about God? Is the statement "God exists" a descriptive fact? That depends on our theology. Suppose our conception of God is that he's a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. In that case, what makes the statement "God exists" true (if such a being existed) is the fact there exists some <em>x</em> that exemplifies the predicates of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. The fact that this <em>x</em> has other predicates, like a penchant for chocolate pie (let us suppose) isn't part of what makes the statement "God exists" true. Similarly, <em>x</em> having a prescriptive ought-to-be-obeyed quality wouldn't be part of what makes "God exists" true. In that case, "God exists" would be a purely descriptive fact.<br /><br />If however having a prescriptive ought-to-be-obeyed quality <em>were</em> part of theology, then "God exists" would not be a purely descriptive fact.<br /><br />If we redefined the natural sciences so that it included prescriptive ought claims in its language, and defined "natural fact" as "a fact that can be stated entirely in the language of psychology and the natural sciences" then potentially some natural facts could be prescriptive ought facts. On the standard definitions however, the language of the natural sciences is purely descriptive, and all natural facts are descriptive facts.Maverick Christianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04286456663634536819noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8766213929139682844.post-66573838055955004932017-10-26T16:56:33.535-07:002017-10-26T16:56:33.535-07:00First off, MC is begging the question when he says...<em>First off, MC is begging the question when he says "if god has a prescriptive ought to obeyed quality" then "god facts" aren't purely descriptive. That's the whole point of the debate!</em><br /><br />I doubt the atheist is debating what the theist's own conception of God is. Theists often predicate a prescriptive "ought-to-be-obeyed" quality to God, but some people have a different conception of God (one could define God in such a way that he would <em>not</em> have a prescriptive ought-to-be-obeyed quality), so YMMV. The upshot is that whether "God exists" is a purely descriptive fact depends largely on which conception of "God" we're working with. If it's the sort of deity that can be expressed entirely in descriptive language, then it's a purely descriptive fact; otherwise it's not.<br /><br /><em>An atheist moral naturalist can do the same kind of "baking in" [a prescriptive ought] action with regards to natural facts:</em><br /><br />I don't think you're going to be able to do that without changing some semantics of what a "natural fact" is. By definition, a "natural fact" is a fact that can be expressed entirely in the <em>language</em> of psychology and the natural sciences. As long as that language is purely descriptive, premise (1) is true, and the subject matter of chemistry, physics etc. seem to concern purely descriptive facts, facts that make claims of what <em>is</em> without claiming what (prescriptively) <em>ought</em> to be; facts like the an electron's mass or the acidity of a solution.<br /><br />Unless you're going to change the subject matter of those fields, I don't think you're going to be able to correctly reject premise (1). If you disagree and think the language of psychology and the natural sciences somehow includes language that is <em>not</em> purely descriptive, a specific example would be nice.<br /><br /><em>Can the atheist hold that some subset of natural facts are inherently prescriptive without begging the question like MC does by using morality as an example?<br /><br />I think the answer is yes, and I can give two examples: Mathematics and Logic.</em><br /><br />Neither of those fields deal with prescriptive oughts as I have defined the term. Roughly, descriptive statements are statements that make claims of what is without making claims of what ought to be, and descriptive oughts are any oughts that can be expressed entirely in descriptive language. For example, "If you want to do well in school, you ought to study" is a descriptive ought when it means "As a matter of practical necessity, you need to study to do well in school" where the latter is a descriptive statement. A prescriptive ought is defined as that type of ought that is not a descriptive ought; it prescribes without being purely descriptive.<br /><br />Rules of math and logic are "prescriptive" in the sense of yielding descriptive oughts (describing what rules you need to follow to accomplish a particular goal; e.g. if you're goal is to accept true conclusions, you ought to do such-and-such) but they don't involve prescriptive oughts. It may be true that you prescriptively <em>ought</em> to accept conclusions of arguments you believe to be sound or theorems you believe to be true, but the fact that the prescriptive ought exists here isn't strictly part of mathematics or logic proper (philosophy of logic is a different ball of wax). There is no theorem of mathematics that the prescriptive ought exists (ditto with logic proper); theorems just tell you what conclusions follow from certain axioms. The existence of prescriptive oughts falls in the domain of philosophy, not mathematics or the natural sciences.Maverick Christianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04286456663634536819noreply@blogger.com